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Alliances play a central role in the battle to improve public 
health in developing countries. Simply put, there are few 
global public health challenges where any single player has 
the funding, research, and delivery capabilities required  
to solve the problem on a worldwide scale. Alliances have 
been formed to reduce the burdens of AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, polio, river blindness, and many other diseases. As 
one measure of their importance, alliances represent nearly 
80 percent of the value of global health investments made 
by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, spearheaded by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), Rotary International, 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and UNICEF,  
has shown the success achievable through collaboration:  
the number of polio cases has been reduced to 150 reported 
cases in 2000, down from more than 500,000 cases in 
1988. Likewise, the Onchocerciasis Control Program, an 
alliance of more than 30 institutions, governments, and 
companies, has worked for the last 25 years to eliminate 
river blindness as a significant health problem throughout  
a major sub-region of West Africa. According to the World 
Bank, the alliance has prevented 600,000 cases of river 
blindness and has added 5 million years of productive labor 
to the economies of 11 countries.1 
Global health alliances face unique challenges, however. 
They typically involve multiple partners from very different 
institutions, and their objectives are challenging and long-
term in nature. Success requires effectively spanning 
national borders to work on an international or even global 
scale. The lack of hard-and-fast guideposts for setting up  
or managing such alliances only adds to these challenges. 
Given the importance of global health alliances, McKinsey 
& Company, at the request of the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, conducted a brief but intense study aimed at 
(1) assessing whether alliances were “working”—i.e., whether 
an alliance was the appropriate choice given the situation, 
whether initiatives were progressing toward their stated 
goals, and whether the partners were accelerating, 
improving, or reducing the cost of initiatives as a result  
of being in the alliance—and (2) identifying the best 
practices that can maximize an alliance’s chances for 
“success.” Our findings on these two questions, summar-
ized below, are based on a review of more than 30 current 
global health alliances as well as an assessment of other 
global health alliances during the past 20 years. The 
reviewers looked at case studies and interviews with more 
than 50 public health leaders in foundations, multilateral 
and bilateral development agencies, other nonprofit 
organizations, private companies, and academic institut-
ions. This article focuses primarily on implementation 
alliances, but our study also assessed alliances among donor 
organizations. (See Exhibit 2, “About the Research,” for 
more details on scope and methodology.)  
WORKING BUT UNDER-PERFORMING  
How successful are global health alliances? Our interviews 
and analyses indicate that more than 80 percent of public 
health alliances appear to be working. In this case, we 
define the “success” of an alliance as an acceleration, 
improvement, or reduction of the cost of initiatives aimed 
at reducing disease burdens in comparison to what could be 
accomplished on a solitary basis. Moreover, in most cases a 
solitary approach was not even feasible given the objectives 
of the initiative. This stands in sharp contrast to the private 
sector’s experience with alliances, where a success rate of 
50 percent (measured vs. financial and strategic objectives) 
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“ As one measure of their importance, alliances represent nearly  
80 percent of the value of global health investments made by  
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.” 
We would like to thank the many people who provided valuable 
comments and information to us during our interviews between August 
and October 2001. We also urge readers to review the extensive literature 
on this topic, including the perspectives of James Austin of Harvard 
Business School, Roy Widdus at Initiative on Public-Private Partner-
ships, and Michael Reich of Harvard School of Public Health. 
is the norm, and where there is often a very real choice 
between alliances and solitary approaches.  
Yet many global health alliances are not reaching their 
potential. Some are not fully capturing the potential  
value from working together while others are off to a slow 
start. For example, some alliances spend the first six to 18 
months doing little more than developing operating plans 
rather than attacking the disease burden. And other 
alliances, even after being launched, are hamstrung by 
limited resources or difficulties in arriving at decisions 
among the various partner organizations.  
MAXIMIZING SUCCESS 
Our research and interviews suggest that the alliances that 
are most capable of reaping the benefits of collaboration 
and that demonstrate progress against relevant output or 
outcome measures tend to be characterized by certain best 
practices (Exhibit 3).  
To begin with, successful global health alliances will have a 
clear and compelling overall goal (e.g., reduce the incidence 
of malaria by 50 percent by 2010), as well as a clear scope, 
as defined in terms of geography, patient populations, func-
tional activities, and time. Indeed, many successful global 
health alliances, including the International Trachoma 
Initiative and the Mectizan Donation Program, start with  
a narrow scope and then expand as success accumulates.  
Beyond ensuring clear overall goals and a focused scope, 
managers and donors seeking to maximize the odds of 
success in global health alliances should ask five questions: 
• Is there a clear understanding of the added value that 
comes from being in an alliance—and what is required  
to capture this value?  
• Have the partners selected an appropriate alliance struc-
ture? As on the racetrack, it is best to choose “horses for 
courses.” Simpler and looser structures are appropriate 
where the level of integration or coordination is limited; 
more complex, tighter structures should be used where the 
potential value is substantial, and where a higher degree of 
coordination or integration is required.  
• Have the partners gone beyond a statement of shared 
objectives—also agreeing on specific success metrics, 
milestones, and partner contributions? 
• Have the “alliance architects” resisted the urge to have 
equality for all, instead creating governance models that  
allow input by stakeholders while ensuring effective 
decision making? 
• Are the alliances characterized by a sufficient number  
of operating staff whose primary objective is the 
alliance’s success? Or, by contrast, are several busy  
people in different organizations sharing the “CEO”  
role? Are operating staff or secretariat staff contributing  
to the alliance on a predominantly part-time or even 
“nights and weekends” basis? 
These five questions are addressed in the balance of  
this article. 
1. WHERE’S THE VALUE? 
Successful alliances will clearly define the most important 
benefits of collaboration, and what the partners have to do 
to capture these sources of value. Unfortunately, our work 
shows that this is often not being done. As one interviewee 
told us: “It seemed obvious that an alliance was the only 
way to solve the problem, so we never tried to demonstrate 
its value.” Another added: “Each of the partners has its own 
very detailed plans—isn’t that enough?” 
Alliance benefits. A quick scan of the global health land-
scape shows that alliances have the potential to create many 
different types of value. Alliance benefits can be grouped 
into five main types: 
Avoiding duplication of investments and activities.  
The Rollback Malaria program, for instance, serves as  
a platform for partners to share information and estab-
lish a common agenda to attack malaria through many 
means (e.g., drugs, bed nets, education). This coord-
ination reduces costs by avoiding duplication of efforts, 
improves efficiencies, and creates other benefits such as 
enhanced awareness. Similarly, partners in the Global 
Alliance for TB Drug Development have “divvied  
up” the research landscape to enhance their overall 
productivity and avoid duplication of activities. 
Gaining scale economies. The Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) is one of many 
alliances using its partners’ added scale to secure 
purchasing and other volume-related discounts. Of 
course, scale economies can go well beyond commodity 
purchasing. For example, the single standard applic-
ation required by GAVI reduces the costs to countries 
that are applying for funding of vaccines programs.  
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Sharing or reducing risks to allow new initiatives to take 
place, which individual partners or donors might not have 
been able or willing to take on alone. In the International 
AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the Medicines for 
Malaria Venture, donors are able to pool their capital 
to invest in a portfolio of high-risk research initiatives.  
Sharing knowledge and resources to improve effectiveness. 
For example, the partners in the Alliance for Cervical 
Cancer Prevention (ACCP) routinely share their 
individual experiences from work in countries like 
South Africa, Thailand, India, and Peru, allowing the 
other partners to accelerate their overall progress. They 
are also pooling their data to develop a cost model that 
will allow better decisions to be made about cervical 
cancer screening and treatment protocols than would 
have been possible without the alliance.  
Accelerating momentum and attracting funding by 
building a common “brand” that gains legitimacy and 
funding support. The Global Polio and Rollback 
Malaria programs have gathered many different 
initiatives under a common umbrella, increasing the 
awareness and support for these causes.  
Beyond these benefits, alliances can also reduce unnecessary 
or detrimental competition between institutions and 
individuals by co-opting potential rivals as members of a 
single unified team. 
It can be an extremely useful exercise to value the benefits 
of cooperation—i.e., quantify the benefits in terms of cost, 
time, or effectiveness gains. One way to do this is to create 
an Alliance Value Scorecard (Exhibit 4) that identifies the 
specific collaborative activities within the alliance and 
articulates very concrete benefits that come from working 
together. While the partners should not attempt to quantify 
all of the benefits of the alliance, it can be extremely helpful 
to identify the top 10 ways where the partners are—or will 
be—working together, and the magnitude of the benefits. 
Done well, this will help the partners prioritize their joint 
work, define specific actions, and understand what sorts of 
resources each partner needs to provide in order to secure 
these gains. 
Alliance costs. A true picture of alliance value must also 
include a view on what additional costs will result from 
being in an alliance. While there are many ways to think 
about alliance costs, partners in global health alliances are 
best served by focusing on the basic operating costs of the 
alliance—that is, the quantifiable costs associated with 
coordinating and convening the partners.  
Our review of the operating budgets of more than 10 global 
health alliances revealed two interesting observations. First, 
few global health alliances are rigorous in assessing alliance-
related costs. Most alliances lump these costs into more 
general categories, such as administration or communi-
cation, obscuring a true picture of the costs of the alliance. 
A second observation is that a number of alliances seem  
to look for ways to control costs that at best would generate 
modest savings at the expense of overall program effective-
ness—for example, trying to keep alliance convening, 
communication, and staffing costs down, but in the process 
severely limiting the upside of the alliance. The costs of 
launching an alliance may be material, and these expenses 
and resources need to be budgeted for up-front in order  
to ensure a robust launch and effective management. 
2. WHICH STRUCTURAL MODEL? 
Developing and managing a successful alliance depends on 
more than understanding the sources of collaborative value. 
To succeed, the partners must create—and revise as neces-
sary as the alliance evolves—an appropriate organizational 
structure. The structure needs to appropriately fit the 
overall goals to the goals and complexities of the particular 
alliance at hand. For example, the “looseness or tightness” 
of the alliance needs to be based on how closely the alliance 
partners must work together in order to capture the main 
sources of value (among other considerations). Some of the 
other dimensions affecting the choice of structure include 
the need for a dedicated alliance organization such as a 
secretariat or new corporate entity, and the existence of  
an acknowledged “leader.”  
Our work suggests that five basic patterns—or structural 
models—are common to global health alliances (Exhibit 5):  
 
 
Simple affiliation. A simple affiliation is the loosest 
form of alliance. It has no formal structure or staff  
and depends on simple mechanisms such as a board/
steering committee, technical working groups, and 
informal communications to make decisions. In most 
cases, the partners operate as equals. 
At many levels, a simple affiliation is an extremely 
attractive model. It introduces limited costs and 
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A B C D 
promotes fast, personalized, and flexible decision-
making. It is particularly appropriate where informal 
collaboration, for example, sharing of knowledge and 
data, is the primary mode of interaction. But since  
a simple affiliation lacks dedicated staff, and typically  
will lack a single accountable leader, the model may  
not always be appropriate. This is often the case  
when an alliance involves a large number of partners  
or where deeper gains are possible through working 
more closely together.  
 
 
Lead partner. The lead partner model is characterized 
by one partner assuming a strong—but not dominant—
leadership role. A recent example is Harvard PARTNERS, 
an initiative focused on conducting operational research 
into multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in Peru. As  
lead partner, Harvard Medical School assembled the 
partners, defines the strategic and technical agenda,  
and works with the other partners (the CDC, WHO, 
the Peruvian National Tuberculosis Program, and 
others) to make operational decisions. 
The lead partner model is often appropriate when  
a moderate number of partners (e.g., four to six)  
are involved, when the alliance is seeking deeper 
coordination or combination gains, and when one 
partner is a natural but not necessarily dominant  
leader (e.g., has recognized expertise in the field  
and the alliance is part of its core mission). 
 
 
General contractor. In the general contractor model,  
one partner is the clear leader, decision maker, and 
controller of funds—and its staff operates the alliance. 
Columbia University, in the Averting Maternal Death 
and Disability initiative, acts as general contractor, 
working with partners such as CARE and Save the 
Children to help deliver emergency obstetric care in 
countries like Bangladesh, Egypt, and Morocco.  
Since the general contractor model places substantial 
power in the hands of one partner, it can be highly 
effective in environments requiring speed and risk-
taking. This model can be especially favorable where  
it is important to have one partner play the project 
manager role, and where one partner has specific and 
crucial skills (e.g., emergency obstetric care expertise). 
To function effectively, however, the general contractor 
must be a leader that others are willing to follow or 
work with as “subcontractors.”  
 
 
Secretariat. The hallmarks of a secretariat are a quasi-
formal alliance organization and staff, a group of 
partners operating as more or less equals, and generally 
having centralized funding. GAVI and the Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative are both examples of secretariats. 
In each case, there is a core group of partners that has 
established a small alliance office (the secretariat) and 
has dedicated a number of skilled managers to support 
key alliance functions (e.g., country coordination, 
advocacy, and application screening). 
Since a secretariat can be somewhat more expensive—
both in dollars and management time—to create  
and maintain, the model is often most appropriate  
when the partners seek deeper combination gains, 
when a large number of diverse partners are involved, 
and when separation from the parent institutions  
is desirable.  
 
 
Joint venture company. A joint venture model is one  
in which the partners create a separate legal entity with 
its own staff and resources, and allow the entity to 
operate more or less independently. Examples include 
the International Trachoma Initiative and the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership in Botswana. 
Joint venture companies require more effort to create 
and roll out, but can offer a number of benefits, 
including added focus and separation from the parent 
institutions. As such, the model is best used when the 
partners seek deep alliance gains while valuing risk 
taking and operating speed. They are also used frequently 
when a private company is directly involved, since they 
provide for some formal separation of the not-for-profit 
activities from the private company’s for-profit activities.  
However, the success of joint venture companies requires 
overcoming the minimum hurdles of establishing a 
separate entity and providing the joint venture with 
sufficient independence and resources. 
 
4 
A B C D 
A B C D 
A B C D 
D C B A 
We do not assert that all global health alliances will fit 
neatly into one of these models. Nor is there one best 
solution for collaboration; each of these models has pros 
and cons.  
Rather, we offer these models as starting points for produc-
tive discussions on how to structure new initiatives, after it 
has been concluded that partnering is essential. This debate 
should include some key questions: Do the partners need  
to work side-by-side in order for the alliance to succeed,  
or will a looser approach work? Does the alliance need a 
dedicated management staff and organization? What are  
the benefits and costs of creating separation from the parent 
institutions? Will the alliance work best if the partners oper-
ate as equals, or should one partner take the lead? Should 
funding flow to the alliance, or is it better for each partner 
to receive its own check? 
(This discussion of structural models has focused on 
implementation alliances. See Exhibit 6 for profiles of 
alternative funding models available to donors.) 
3. ARE THE “MINIMUMS” OF OPERATIONAL 
PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT  
IN PLACE? 
Global health alliances—like all alliances—can go a long 
way to raise their odds of success if certain minimums are 
met in the areas of operational planning, partner commit-
ments, and performance setting and monitoring. We found 
that many global health alliances are lacking elements that 
are fairly common in corporate alliances, often leading to 
significant losses in time and efficiency. For example, many 
alliances get off to a slow start because the partners do not 
have a detailed operating plan in place at launch or shortly 
thereafter. Others, including one prominent global con-
sortium, encounter management problems such as slow 
decision making and insufficient access to parent resources. 
To avoid these problems, it can be useful to focus on 
meeting a set of “operating minimums” at different phases 
of the venture life cycle. For example, it is essential that the 
partners define their roles and make specific commitments 
as to what resources (e.g., staff, technology, money, facilities) 
each will contribute to the alliance very early on. Likewise, 
the partners should share a concrete view of what “success” 
will look like at different points in the future—for instance, 
at the end of years two and five—by implementing specific 
performance metrics.  
The operating minimums will change as the alliance gets 
underway. For example, within 100 days after launching 
the alliance, the partners should have developed a detailed 
workplan with specific activities attached to each work-
stream. In addition, the partners should have translated  
the general performance goals into a simple but powerful 
performance scorecard. Our work suggests that it can be 
very helpful to develop such a scorecard that tracks alliance 
performance across three “fitness” dimensions: outcome 
performance, activity performance, and relationship 
performance (Exhibit 7).  
4. DOES GOVERNANCE BALANCE POWER  
WITH PARTICIPATION?  
Another hallmark of successful alliances is good govern-
ance—and in particular, decision making that balances  
the need for speed with the benefits of wider participation. 
Creating such a decision-making system is difficult in 
global health alliances, where there may be anywhere  
from a handful to several dozen partners with very diverse 
operating and decision styles. Consider an alliance that  
ran into some early problems because of too many decision 
makers being at the table. As one interviewee told us: “I was 
one of 35 people recently invited to a board meeting, which 
is indicative of the whole alliance. There is a lack of leader-
ship and courage, the alliance is always trying to please and 
include everyone.” 
How do alliances avoid these and other problems and  
create a governance structure that promotes fast and strong 
decision making while involving a large number of people 
and institutions? Our work shows that three actions can go 
a long way to reaching this goal: 
Limit the number of main decision-making bodies— 
but not communications channels. Well-developed global 
health alliances tend to be characterized by a dense and 
complicated web of committees, subcommittees, and 
interest groups. These committees can be an important 
mechanism that facilitates communication and collab-
orative work among the partners, especially when the 
alliance lacks a full-time staff. But it is essential to limit 
the number of decision-making bodies to one or two;  
a common practice is to establish a board that makes 
most policy decisions in tandem with a technical 
committee that oversees major scientific decisions. 
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Keep the number of people on the main governance bodies 
small—and “representative” if necessary. The Global 
Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) has done 
just this. To develop the vision and structure for 
GAIN, which is an alliance of more than 30 instit-
utions, the partners appointed representatives to an 
eight-member structuring team. This meant that the 
main multilateral partners—the World Bank, WHO, 
and UNICEF—appointed one person to represent 
their collective interests.  
Develop a decision-making roadmap. Effective decision 
making depends on a clear understanding of who will 
be involved in what decisions. Global health alliances, 
with their desire for consensus, are prone to having  
too many people involved in decisions, too little 
individual accountability for decisions, and therefore 
slow decision-making. To overcome this problem with-
out putting too much power in the hands of a few, it 
can be quite useful to develop a roadmap for how the 
alliance will make its 10 to 15 most important decis-
ions. If well defined, such a decision-making protocol 
will spell out which decision makers (e.g., alliance 
director, alliance operating team, steering committee, 
parent institution president) will review, vote on, or 
decide each major decision (e.g., approval of the annual 
plan and budget, expansions in geographic scope, 
funding of programs, etc.).  
5. DOES THE ALLIANCE HAVE ENOUGH 
DEDICATED “HORSEPOWER”? 
Finally, strong alliances depend on people, so it is essential 
to have the right mix of skilled, credible, and committed 
individuals to drive the alliance forward. While getting the 
“people part” right is a complicated and idiosyncratic task 
(and alliances remain vulnerable to personalities), it can be 
useful to think about staffing on three levels:  
Senior champions. This is the one person from the 
leadership team of each parent institution who “owns” 
the relationship, works hard to secure the resources  
and commitments, and is constantly on the lookout  
for new opportunities.  
The alliance leader. This is the individual clearly on  
the hook for the overall success of the alliance. The  
best alliances, including GAVI and IAVI, will recruit 
an individual leader with the skills, contacts, and 
personality to make things happen, and structure  
their role to make them personally accountable for  
the venture’s overall success. Importantly, the alliance 
leader should see the success of the alliance as his or  
her top priority—not a “nights and weekends” job. 
The alliance working staff. This staffing dimension is 
the most often overlooked—and it is the operational 
horsepower of the alliance. Global health alliances, 
especially those that go beyond the loose affiliation 
model, are much more likely to succeed when a small 
but deeply committed team drives day-to-day activities. 
As a general rule, an alliance should have a team  
of operating managers who are at least 50 percent 
dedicated to the alliance. The total size of this group 
will vary according to the nature of the alliance:  
some alliances may need only two or three dedicated 
people, whereas larger alliances like Global Polio  
and GAVI, or more freestanding ventures such as  
the International Trachoma Initiative, may need  
more. Having a dedicated team in place will create  
the individual motivation, accountability, and esprit  
de corps needed to make alliances succeed.  
SUMMARY 
Alliances are crucial to the effort to improve health 
conditions in developing countries. Our review of over  
30 such alliances indicates that most alliances are advancing 
the cause by accelerating, improving, or reducing the cost  
of global health initiatives. However, as our research has 
shown, a more disciplined approach to structuring and 
managing these alliances can lead to even greater impact 
from the limited resources that are available. Global health 
alliances that follow industry best practices, such as having  
a clear and compelling overall goal along with a clear scope 
for the work to be undertaken, stand to achieve higher 
levels of success. Those alliances willing to ask and answer 
the five questions outlined in this article can capitalize  
on their strengths and identify their weaknesses to better 
position their organizations for greater success in the future. 
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During the fall of 2001, McKinsey & Company, at the 
request of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, cond-
ucted a research study on global health alliances. Our aim 
was to understand general performance patterns and key 
success factors in forming, launching, and managing 
global health alliances. 
For our research, we defined “alliance” as an initiative 
involving two or more institutions characterized by shared 
goals and decision making, coordination or combination  
of resources, and some shared accountability.  
We did not limit our work to public-private partnerships. 
Rather, we considered alliances that involved partners of 
various types: multilateral organizations such as the World 
Bank and WHO, bilateral government donors such as  
the Agency for International Development, for-profit 
companies in the pharmaceutical sector, other nonprofits 
such as Save the Children and Program for Appropriate 
Technology in Health, and foundation donors. Although 
the perspectives from our work are applicable to public-
private alliances, we are well aware that alliances between 
public institutions and private companies need to meet 
additional hurdles. 
Our scope included a range of alliance objectives,  
health problems, geographies, and partners. We looked  
at alliances focused on basic and operational research as 
well as delivery of drugs, vaccines, and care. The sample 
included alliances aimed at TB, malaria, AIDS, and most 
of the other leading diseases.  
To conduct the research, we drew on existing public 
literature as well as McKinsey’s knowledge base and 
experience with alliances in healthcare, emerging markets, 
and the nonprofit sector. The main engine of our research, 
however, was a set of interviews with more than 50 leading 
experts in public health. These interviewees, from multi-
laterals, governments, foundations, pharmaceutical companies, 
and non-governmental organizations, are among the  
most prominent and experienced people in the field, and 
graciously contributed their time and candid insights into 
more than 30 global health alliances. Given the confidential 
nature of many of these discussions, the specific examples 
cited in this article are based on public sources, or are 
provided with the permission of interviewees. 
In our interviews and case analyses, we assessed the progress 
of alliances on two dimensions: (1) whether they were on 
track to achieve the scientific or public health objective and 
(2) whether the alliance partners had captured benefits of 
combining resources or coordinating efforts (i.e., has the 
existence of an alliance accelerated progress, improved the 
quality of outputs or outcomes, or reduced costs relative  
to a go-alone approach?). We also identified a number  
of best practices for global health alliances. Note that in  
our study, and in this article, we are not addressing the 
underlying scientific merit or relevance of the specific out-
comes being pursued by each alliance. Also, the conclusions 
in this article should be viewed as indicative because of the 
“newness” of many of the alliances and the limited sample. 
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Exhibit 2 ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
 YES NO 
OVERALL GOALS AND SCOPE 
  
Simple and compelling overall goal ___ ___ 
Clearly defined and focused scope (e.g., geography, disease, patient population, functional activities) 
 
___ ___ 
ALLIANCE VALUE 
  
Clear rationale for using an alliance vs. alternatives ___ ___ 
Crisp articulation of alliance benefits and costs  
 
___ ___ 
STRUCTURAL MODEL 
  
Appropriate choice of alliance structural model 
 
___ ___ 
OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
  
Clear partner commitments (e.g., people, money, technology) ___ ___ 
Performance metrics and milestones in place ___ ___ 
Detailed operating and funding plans, updated as needed 
 
___ ___ 
GOVERNANCE AND DECISION MAKING 
  
One or two primary governance boards with small number of members—“representative” if necessary  ___ ___ 
Clear decision-making rights for 10 to 20 most important decisions 
 
___ ___ 
STAFF 
  
Senior champions in partner organizations, actively engaged  ___ ___ 
Accountable alliance leader with strong skills, contacts, and authority ___ ___ 
Focused working team (e.g., more than 50 percent dedicated) to structure, launch, and manage the alliance 
 
___ ___ 
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Exhibit 3 BEST PRACTICES—How does your alliance stack up? 
 AREA AND INITIATIVE COST SAVINGS TIME SAVINGS OTHER VALUE 
AVOIDING DUPLICATION 
   
Partners avoid or combine overlapping initiatives or assets to reduce costs, increase 
speed, and improve quality. 
 
Initiative 1: _________________   Initiative 2: _________________  
 
   
GAINING SCALE ECONOMIES 
   
Partners use their added scale to secure purchasing and other volume-related discounts. 
 
Initiative 1: _________________   Initiative 2: _________________  
 
   
SHARING OR REDUCING RISK 
   
Partners pool capital or other resources to reduce or spread risks and thus allow new 
initiatives to take place, which individual partners or donors might not have been able or 
willing to take on alone.  
 
Initiative 1: _________________   Initiative 2: _________________  
 
   
SHARING KNOWLEDGE TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 
   
Partners share detailed information and insights from their own initiatives (field tests, etc.), 
improving their partners’ effectiveness or efficiency as a result. 
 
Initiative 1: _________________   Initiative 2: _________________  
 
   
ACCELERATING MOMENTUM TO ATTRACT FUNDING 
   
Partners build a common “brand” that gains legitimacy and funding support.  
 
Initiative 1: _________________   Initiative 2: _________________  
 
   
ESTIMATED VALUE   
DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL  
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Exhibit 4 ALLIANCE VALUE SCORECARD  
 FACTORS FAVORING USE EXAMPLES 
SIMPLE AFFILIATION • Alliance aimed at simple coordination gains 
• Low to moderate investment 
• No single leader 
 
• Alliance for Cervical Cancer Prevention  
 
 
LEAD PARTNER • Moderate (four to six) number of partners 
• Alliance aimed at deeper coordination or  
combination gains 
• One partner is natural but not dominant leader  
• Harvard PARTNERS 
 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR • Alliance aimed at coordination and rationalization  
of multiple independent initiatives 
• Strong need for risk-taking or speed 
• One partner is undisputed leader in the field 
• Averting Maternal Death and Disability  
 
SECRETARIAT • Moderate to high (4 to 30) number of partners  
• Moderate to high investment 
• Alliance aimed at deeper coordination and  
combination gains 
• Need to create focused team/resources 
• Multilateral institutions often involved as  
core partners 
• Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization  
• Global Polio Eradication Initiative 
 
JOINT VENTURE COMPANY • Strong need for risk taking and/or operating speed 
• Alliance aimed at combination gains 
• Private company often involved  
• Moderate to high investment 
• Clear benefits of separation from  
partners’ institutions  
• International Trachoma Initiative  
• African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership  
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Exhibit 5 ALLIANCE STRUCTURAL MODELS  
A B C D 
A B C D 
A B C D 
A B C D 
D C B A 
Our work shows that there are three basic funding models 
in global health—single funders, multiple funders, and 
funding alliances—each of which is appropriate in certain 
situations (Exhibit A). 
Single funders. A single funder model should be considered 
when the problem is focused, easily solvable, when the cost 
is low, or when the need for speed is critical. For example, 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation funded the Oxford 
Tak Malaria Initiative between Oxford University and 
Mahidol University. The goal of the alliance is to evaluate 
and then roll out a new malaria regimen in Thailand.  
The level of investment is modest ($5 million) and the  
need for speed is high because of the rapid development  
of malarial resistance. 
Multiple funders. Under some conditions it may be  
more appropriate to use a multiple funder model, in which 
a group of donors support a grantee but do not work closely 
together to shape the strategy. Multiple funder alliances 
tend to be best used to solve significant problems with fairly 
clear solutions. The Alliance for the Elimination of Iodine 
Deficiency Disorders is a case in point: the challenge is to 
improve the levels of salt iodization in developing countries. 
The solution to the problem, while broad in geographic  
and financial scope, was clear. As such, there is less need  
for funders to work closely together to resolve thorny issues 
of how to attack the problem.  
Funding alliances. Launching and sustaining a successful 
global health initiative often demands more than an 
implementation alliance—in many cases, it also means 
creating and maintaining an alliance of funders. GAVI, 
IAVI, and the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development 
are three prominent initiatives that have benefited from 
close ties among a network of donors.  
Consider the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development. 
Formed in 2000, its basic premise is to identify and invest 
in promising TB-related research initiatives that otherwise 
lack support owing to limited commercial prospects. The 
initial idea for the alliance came from the Rockefeller 
Foundation (which was also seminal in creating IAVI). 
Rather than invest alone, the Rockefeller Foundation 
understood that significant benefits stood to be gained  
from taking the time to build a funding alliance.  
To do this, the Rockefeller Foundation convened key 
stakeholders around a common vision and drove them to 
agreement on the core issues of the venture. The funding 
alliance has created broad-based support in the community. 
It has also improved access to valuable resources since many 
institutions now have “skin in the game.” Additionally,  
it has reduced the costs of governance and oversight since 
funders are able to delegate certain monitoring activities  
to a subset of partners. 
In simple terms, a funding alliance is best used when there  
is a complex and broad problem, often without an agreed 
upon solution. Funding alliances are also important when 
sustainability is key—i.e., solving the problem will take a 
large investment over a sustained period. The Global Alliance 
for TB Drug Development met all these conditions. 
DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL  
GLOBAL HEALTH ALLIANCES 
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Exhibit 6 ALTERNATIVE FUNDING MODELS  
 FACTORS FAVORING USE 
SINGLE FUNDER 
One funder supports 
the initiative 
• Discrete, solvable problem 
• Low/moderate cost 
• Other players not willing or able 
to make investment now 
• Speed more critical than buy-in  
MULTIPLE FUNDER 
Multiple funders 
support an initiative, 
but do not work 
together to shape the 
initiative 
• Initiative is “ready to go” but 
money needed to execute 
• Fundraising process in place 
• Buy-in from multiple donors 
important 
• Executive independence from 
funders beneficial 
FUNDING ALLIANCE 
Multiple funders work 
together to shape the 
strategy and/or 
implementation of the 
initiative 
• Complex problem  
• Investment larger than any  
one funder willing or able to 
make alone 
• Broad involvement of donors 
more important than speed 
• Desire to avoid redundant 
activities of co-funders (e.g., 
oversight, due diligence) 
FUNDING MODELS Exhibit A 
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Exhibit 7 ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE SCORECARD 
 PERFORMANCE RATING  
 MISSED                                                     MET                                               EXCEEDED 
STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE  
Number of lives saved (vs. plan)  
Number of patients treated (vs. total infected population)  
Number of productive labor years added  
Percent of target countries with greater than  
80 percent immunization rates 
 
 
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE                          
Overall performance vs. operating plan  
Number of surgeries performed  
Number of vaccinizations given  
Number of training workshops provided (vs. plan) 
 
 
RELATIONSHIP PERFORMANCE 
 
Decision-making speed (vs. similar alliances)  
Partner follow-through on commitments   
Management effectiveness and speed  
Alliance operating staff turnover rate  
Partner commitment and satisfaction rating 
 
 
NOTES 
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